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The Economic Development Institute 
"The essence of the knowledge is, having it, to apply it; not having it, 
to confess your ignorance. Ignorance is the night of the mind, but a 
night without moon or star". 
 
Confucius. 
"It is not the degree that makes a great man; it is the man that makes 
the degree great" 
 
Nicoli Machiavelli. 
   
The Economic Development Institute under the theme Global Thinking Research was 
established in 2001. We are group of past students of the University of the West Indies living 
in and outside Jamaica. We came to the realization from when we were on the Mona 
Campus that in the Information Age we live in, successful people are those who have access 
to information. We formed a group to share in this New Way of Thinking and found it fruitful 
to our endeavours . Unfortunately, we had to restrict our information bases in many cases as 
our lecturers and tutors deemed it fit to remain in a vacuum of limitation with regards to the 
evolution of the New Information Paradigm. We were clearly ahead of our time.  We have 
developed this new product called the Information Booklet Series (which there is a need for), the 
product provides information on topical issues in the areas of Management, Sports, 
Information Technology, Public Administration, Information and Communication, 
Economics, Economic Development, Social Development, Legal Education, Industrial 
Relations at competitive prices. We have kept it simple so that all can understand and 
appreciate. As such, we do not regard them as theses on the chosen areas and they do not 
seek academic recognition, however they do meet WIPO (World Intellectual Property 
Organization) Standards. We hope you will find the following informative and instructive 
and as usual your comments would be appreciated. 
 
Peter W. Jones 
Executive Director  





We thank the following Individuals and Organizations for their assistance and guidance with the 
preparation of this document: Association Des Entreprises Privees- AFEP, Mouvement Francaise 
Des Entreprises De France ￿MEDEF, Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance 
(CACG), German Panel On Corporate Governance, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, International 





The simple model of corporate structure in which shareholders provide the capital, the directors and 
the managers organize and run the business, and the employees do the work forms the basis of the 
system of corporate governance in countries, like ours, following the common law tradition. 
By corporate governance we refer to the set of rules, regulations and institutions which control and 
govern the relationships between the company’s shareholders, the board of directors and the board’s 
controlling bodies, both internal and external to the company. Corporate governance is designed to 
govern the relationship between directors, shareholders, and the public based on the notion that the 
directors are accountable to the shareholders in their overriding duty to maximize profits. In 
addition to providing checks and balances between the interests of shareholders and the powers of 
the directors and professional managers, corporate governance should provide for banks and other 
companies to serve the interests of wider constituencies of stakeholders such as employees, 
consumers, depositors, and the public. 
Jamaica in order to effectively interface with the global village has been forced to change its ethical 
mindset, which has deterred the practice of good corporate governance and its worldview of how to 
aggressively achieve business success in an era, which does business via the Internet and other forms 
of wireless communication making business real-time. In Jamaica those companies who have not 
listened to the wisdom of those who deemed fit to make radical changes as it was deemed then have 
become names in the business historical archives of Jamaica as these companies no longer exist. 
 
Ethical dilemmas can sometimes skew the expected outcome for good corporate governance. Talk 
about ethics rests on the assumption that businesses ought to adhere to a socially responsible  
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approach to decision making called the social responsibility approach. Proponents of this approach 
believe that corporations have societal obligations that go beyond maximizing profits. It is argued 
that because corporations are so powerful, they have an obligation to assume social responsibilities. 
Corporations should be managed for the benefit of their stakeholders: their customers, suppliers, 
employees and local communities as well as their owners. Corporate leaders bear a fiduciary 
responsibility to all stakeholders. 
Flying in the face of the ￿politically correct￿ philosophy espoused at most institutions is a competing 
school of thought led by Milton Friedman of the University of Chicago. Friedman believes 
businesses sole duty is to make profits. ￿ Businesses are in the business of maximizing shareholders￿ 
value by a prudent use of scarce organizational resources, as long as the activities of the business are 
within the letter of the law.￿ 
Although Friedman is exalted as one of the defenders of capitalism most business schools tend to 
discourage his views when it comes to ethics. Do the board of directors of most companies in 
Jamaica still think like Milton Friedman? 
 
There are two major topics taught in ethics (but not limited to): relativism and stakeholder analysis. 
Stakeholder analysis provides a structure with which to confront ethical decisions. Relativism 
examines why we often ignore ethics in decision-making this note will concentrate on relativism.  
 
Did an overt practice of relativism by boards of directors of certain companies in the 1990￿s 
lead to their demise?,   
The proponents of relativism hold that we cant decide on matters of right or wrong, or good or evil. 
Things are rarely black or white. There are so many shades of gray. Relativism proposes that ethics 
are relative to personal, social and cultural circumstances in which one finds itself. Relativists are not 
torn by ethical dilemmas since they do believe that truth can be discovered through soul searching. 
There are four forms: Na￿ve, Role, Social group and Cultural. 
 
The Na￿ve form holds that every person has his or her own standard that enables him or her to 
make choices. Therefore an executive at company X is not equipped to make a moral judgment 
regarding the actions of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of company Y, whose corporation is 
possibly selling harmful baby formula in developing countries. 
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The Role form distinguishes between our private selves and our public roles. The president of a 
fishing company may personally dislike the killing of dolphins in his company￿s tuna nets, but as a 
company executive, he must not let his feelings interfere with the best interests of the company. 
The Social form is akin to the na￿ve form. In the produce industry, it could be ￿industry practice￿ to 
ignore child labour laws and employ small children to work in the field and miss school. 
The Cultural form holds that there is no universal moral code to judge another￿s society￿s moral and 
ethical standards. As such, under apartheid in South Africa, gold and diamond mining activities by 
multinational corporations using ￿slave labour￿ in the mines could be justified. 
 
Recent high-profile events internationally and wide-sweeping reforms have created an enormously 
challenging environment for corporate governance. Pressured by increasing demands for greater 
knowledge, independence, and accountability, corporate boards of directors are finding themselves 
under more intense scrutiny than ever. Strengthening the performance of both the board and 
company management is now a formidable task that requires extraordinary leadership. 
Many boards worldwide and in Jamaica are seriously searching for answers to the following:  
 
￿ what factors motivate senior executives￿and what role does compensation play in 
this motivation? 
￿ What characteristics define equitable compensation plans that also motivate? What 
distinguishes high compensation from overcompensation￿and when is high pay justifiable? 
￿ The  determining of CEO compensation, designing compensation plans for other senior managers, 
and approving performance targets and compensation 
levels? 
￿ What does an effective process for committee activities look like￿and how should 
compensation consultants, the CEO or his/her representative, and the senior human 
resource officer be involved in the process? Also, how should the committee relate to 
each of these players? 
￿ How should compensation plans be related to performance evaluation practices? 
 
Perhaps most important,  the opportunity to determine the extent to which their own board￿s 
compensation plans need rebuilding and to rethink their respective committee charters. 
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Audit Committees in a New Era of Governance is designed to prepare audit committee chairs and 
members, as well as CFOs, to operate successfully amid new regulations and emerging governance 
issues. This helps to understand the its impact on the roles, responsibilities, and liabilities of audit 
committees. It then encourages them to rethink their committees￿ activities and to formulate 
approaches for the effective resolution of specific challenges. 
 
Other  key issues to  identify current and future challenges, foster necessary relationships, and 
accelerate required changes are: 
￿ How should audit committees and management deal with the heightened demand for 
greater oversight and a higher level of financial and accounting expertise? 
￿ How can audit committees improve transparency for investors? 
￿ How should audit committees handle the impact of investor expectations on management financial 
reporting and disclosure procedures? 
￿ What role, if any, do audit committees play in the investor relations process? 
￿ How can audit committees better manage their relationships with the boards of directors, 
corporate management, internal auditors, and external auditors? 
￿ What should the charters of company audit committees contain? 
Ultimately, board members will gain valuable insights about the technical responsibilities and 
ethical considerations of audit committees and company management in ensuring 
performance accountability. 
 
The answers to these questions should develop techniques, strategies, and action plans to improve 
governance performance, further their own board￿s development, and maximize individual 
contributions to company boards not only world ￿wide but in Jamaica. 
Specific board issues in the overall context of structuring a relationship that facilitates cooperation 
between the board of directors and corporate management should include: 
 
￿ Board composition and director selection 
￿ Setting time-efficient agendas 
￿ Conducting dynamic, constructive board meetings 
￿ Role of the board in strategic planning and as an agent of positive change 
￿ CEO evaluation and compensation  
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￿ CEO succession 
￿ Dealing with unanticipated company crises or opportunities, i.e., takeovers, CEO firings, etc. 
￿ Effective use of committees 
￿ Designing performance scorecards to monitor business strategy and management performance 
￿ Evaluation of the board and its members 
￿ Director compensation and stock ownership 
￿ Role of the board and audit committee in formulating an external financial reporting 
and disclosure strategy 
￿ Changes to the legal responsibilities of directors 
 
Serious reflection of all of the above should be of importance to open debate on a new paradigm of 
corporate governance in Jamaica and change the mindset in order for us to be serious entrants to the 
Global Village. 
 
Government Has to Lead The Way? 
 
 
Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities 
 
The government sector should be distinguished from the rest of the public sector and from the 
rest of the economy, and policy and management roles within the public sector should be clear 
and publicly disclosed.  
1 The structure and functions of government should be clearly specified.  
2 The responsibilities of different levels of government, and of the executive branch, the 
legislative branch, and the judiciary, should be well defined. 
3 Clear mechanisms for the coordination and management of budgetary and extrabudgetary 
activities should be established. 
4 Relations between the government and nongovernment public sector agencies (i.e., the central 
bank, public financial institutions, and nonfinancial public enterprises) should be based on clear 
arrangements. 
.5 Government involvement in the private sector (e.g., through regulation and equity ownership) 
should be conducted in an open and public manner, and on the basis of clear rules and 
procedures that are applied in a nondiscriminatory way.  
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There should be a clear legal and administrative framework for fiscal 
management. 
.1 Any commitment or expenditure of public funds should be governed by comprehensive budget 
laws and openly available administrative rules.  
.2 Taxes, duties, fees, and charges should have an explicit legal basis. Tax laws and regulations 
should be easily accessible and understandable, and clear criteria should guide any 
administrative discretion in their application. 
3 Ethical standards of behavior for public servants should be clear and well publicized. 
Public Availability of Information 
The public should be provided with full information on the past, current, and projected fiscal 
activity of government. 
1 The budget documentation, final accounts, and other fiscal reports for the public should cover 
all budgetary and extra budgetary activities of the central government, and the consolidated fiscal 
position of the central government should be published. 
2 Information comparable to that in the annual budget should be provided for the outturns of the 
two preceding fiscal years, together with forecasts of the main budget aggregates for two years 
following the budget. 
3 Statements describing the nature and fiscal significance of central government contingent 
liabilities and tax expenditures, and of quasi-fiscal activities, should be part of the budget 
documentation.  
4 The central government should publish full information on the level and composition of its 
debt and financial assets. 
5 Where subnational levels of government are significant, their combined fiscal position and the 
consolidated fiscal position of the general government should be published. 
A commitment should be made to the timely publication of fiscal information. 
.1 The publication of fiscal information should be a legal obligation of government. 
 2 Advance release date calendars for fiscal information should be announced.  
Open Budget Preparation, Execution, and Reporting 
The budget documentation should specify fiscal policy objectives, the macroeconomic 
framework, the policy basis for the budget, and identifiable major fiscal risks.  
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1 A statement of fiscal policy objectives and an assessment of fiscal sustainability should provide 
the framework for the annual budget. 
2 Any fiscal rules that have been adopted (e.g., a balanced budget requirement or borrowing 
limits for subnational levels of government) should be clearly specified. 
3 The annual budget should be prepared and presented within a comprehensive and consistent 
quantitative macroeconomic framework, and the main assumptions underlying the budget should 
be provided. 
4 New policies being introduced in the annual budget should be clearly described.  
5 Major fiscal risks should be identified and quantified where possible, including variations in 
economic assumptions and the uncertain costs of specific expenditure commitments (e.g., 
financial restructuring). 
Budget information should be presented in a way that facilitates policy 
analysis and promotes accountability. 
1 Budget data should be reported on a gross basis, distinguishing revenue, expenditure, and 
financing, with expenditure classified by economic, functional, and administrative category. Data 
on extrabudgetary activities should be reported on the same basis. 
2 A statement of objectives to be achieved by major budget programs (e.g., improvement in 
relevant social indicators) should be provided. 
3 The overall balance of the general government should be a standard summary indicator of the 
government's fiscal position. It should be supplemented where appropriate by other fiscal 
indicators for the general government (e.g., the operational balance, the structural balance, or the 
primary balance).  
4 The public sector balance should be reported when nongovernment public sector agencies 
undertake significant quasi-fiscal activities. 
Procedures for the execution and monitoring of approved expenditure and for 
collecting revenue should be clearly specified. 
1 There should be a comprehensive, integrated accounting system which provides a reliable basis 
for assessing payment arrears. 
2 Procurement and employment regulations should be standardized and accessible to all 
interested parties. 
3 Budget execution should be internally audited, and audit procedures should be open to review.  
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4 The national tax administration should be legally protected from political direction and should 
report regularly to the public on its activities. 
 There should be regular fiscal reporting to the legislature and the public.  
1 A mid-year report on budget developments should be presented to the legislature. More 
frequent (at least quarterly) reports should also be published.  
2 Final accounts should be presented to the legislature within a year of the end of the fiscal year. 
3 Results achieved relative to the objectives of major budget programs should be presented to the 
legislature annually. 
There needs to be Assurances of Integrity as such: 
 Fiscal data should meet accepted data quality standards. 
1 Budget data should reflect recent revenue and expenditure trends, underlying macroeconomic 
developments, and well-defined policy commitments.  
2 The annual budget and final accounts should indicate the accounting basis (e.g., cash or 
accrual) and standards used in the compilation and presentation of budget data. 
3 Specific assurances should be provided as to the quality of fiscal data. In particular, it should 
be indicated whether data in fiscal reports are internally consistent and have been reconciled with 
relevant data from other sources.  
Fiscal information should be subjected to independent scrutiny. 
1 A national audit body or equivalent organization, which is independent of the executive, should 
provide timely reports for the legislature and public on the financial integrity of government 
accounts. 
2 Independent experts should be invited to assess fiscal forecasts, the macroeconomic forecasts 
on which they are based, and all underlying assumptions. 
3 A national statistics agency should be provided with the institutional independence to verify 
the quality of fiscal data. 
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Corporate Jamaica and the New Mindset 
 
The duties/responsibilities of a director at common law can be conveniently discussed under two 
headings: 
 Fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith.  
 Duties of skill and care.  
A director￿s fiduciary duty of loyalty and good faith can be further broken down into four separate 
rules.  
(a) Directors should act in good faith in what they truly believe to be in the best interest of the 
company. 
(b) Directors should not abuse the powers conferred on them by the  office they hold. 
(c) Directors should not restrict their discretion in how they act. 
(d) Directors should not, without the informed consent of the company, put themselves in a 
position where their personal interests are likely to conflict with those of the company. 
The Australian case of Mills v. Mills (1938) establishes that the court can be quite liberal in 
determining reasonable expectations of directors￿ actions deemed to be in good faith. In Mills, it was 
stated that directors are "not required by law to live in an unreal region of detached altruism and to 
act in a vague mood of ideal abstraction from obvious facts which must be present to the mind of 
any honest and intelligent man when he exercises his powers as a director." 
Even though it is well established by law that the duties of the directors are primarily owed to the 
company, this does not mean that there can be no circumstances in which the rights of creditors 
take primacy over those of the company. 
Such circumstances would exist where a company has lost all its capital. In this situation 
shareholders have no financial interests and the directors have a duty to stop trading. As Lord  
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Diplock opined in Lournho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum Co. Ltd. (1980), the principle that directors must 
act in the best interests of the company "are not exclusively those of its shareholders but may 
include those of its creditors." In West Mercia Safetywear Limited v. Dodd (1988), the Court of 
Appeal held that a director of an insolvent company must have regard to the interests of its 
creditors. 
In an apparent move to strengthen the framework of determining directors￿ responsibilities, 
provisions in the new Companies Act would codify the common law standard of directors￿ duty of 
care and skill. Every director and officer of a company in exercising his powers and discharging his 
duties must act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the company.  
It would also provide that in determining what are the best interests of a company, a director must 
have regard to the interests of the company’s employees in general, its shareholders, and the interests 
of the community in which the company operates. This provision expressly recognizes a broad 
scope of stakeholders.  
This introduces an objective test of care and skill from the Canadian model, stating that every 
director and officer of a company, in exercising his powers and discharging his duties shall exercise 
the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable 
circumstances.  
Some of the problems of Management , especially top management  which have led to the demise of 
companies in Jamaica is as follows: 
 Lack of, or poor strategic planning  
 Failures in the exercise of due diligence and care, specifically:  
 Inadequate credit/investment assessment and monitoring;  
 Excessive credit concentration;  
 Inadequate capital levels;  
 High and non-income earning levels of related party exposure;  
 High and increasing levels of non-performing assets;  
 Lack of, or non-compliance with proper internal control procedures and effective risk 
management principles; and  
 Ineffective supervision of the management of these institutions by their board of directors.  
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When these issues are critically examined against the responsibilities of directors as I have previously 
outlined, it seems quite clear to me that several directors of distressed companies were found 
wanting in the execution of their responsibilities. I would suggest, however, based on my own 
experience and dialogue with some directors that many did not properly understand their role. 
Consequently, I would suggest that there is a need for companies, to make affirmative efforts to 
select directors with the requisite knowledge and qualifications to actively and meaningfully 
contribute to the decision-making process. Further, an on-going programme of education must exist 
to allow directors to continually develop their knowledge base on issues related to the company￿s 
business. Moreover, beyond the exercise of good judgment in selection of directors, it is imperative 
that companies develop a culture of strong corporate governance. 
In Canada, the Toronto and Montreal Stock Exchanges have adopted guidelines for effective 
corporate governance. The Toronto and Montreal Stock Exchanges require that each listed 
corporation incorporated in Canada or in a province of Canada disclose its approach to corporate 
governance with reference to these guidelines in annual reports and offering circulars. In the 
United Kingdom, corporate governance is the subject of principled discussion in documents such 
as the Cadbury and Greenbury Codes. In the United States, corporate governance is widely 
discussed by scholars and academics.  
There is a need for companies in Jamaica to take a proactive role in facilitating improved 
governance on the part of their directors. The voluntary formulation of corporate governance as 
compared to that enacted by regulators will engender a deeper sense of commitment on the part 
of corporate management. In a dynamic, competitive environment it is imperative that directors 
and managers of corporations constantly review, evaluate and as necessary modify governance 
practices to ensure the effectiveness of their corporate governance, to guard against moral 
hazard, and to favourably compete in the marketplace. 
The continuous development and evolution of a high standard of corporate governance should be 
a priority for companies in Jamaica. 
To assist companies in developing these standards, I would suggest the following:   
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a)They should seek to obtain information on  corporate governance practices of similar and 
successful  institutions in Jamaica and the Caribbean as well as other commonwealth countries such 
as the United Kingdom and  Canada.  
(b) Companies should critically review their current corporate governance practices against those of 
the counterparts suggested above to identify weaknesses and opportunities for improvement. This 
review should be conducted where possible with the assistance of external consultants to ensure that 
it is as objective as possible. 
(c) Companies should ensure that persons appointed to boards are of the requisite skill, knowledge, 
temperament and character necessary to ensure proper conduct and a meaningful contribution to 
the company’s affairs. 
(d) Companies should hold regular training and review sessions for directors, especially new 
directors, to ensure that they understand their role, the purpose and objectives of the company, and 
are keeping abreast of new standards in corporate governance. Directors should understand both the 
Financial Institution’s business environment and the legal and regulatory framework within which 
the Financial Institution’s activities operate.  
(e) Companies can assist in keeping directors informed about industry trends and other matters by 
including them in management presentations on business activities and industry developments, bank 
counsel briefings or reports on legislative and regulatory changes, pending litigation, and emerging 
compliance or legal issues, and bank auditor briefings on major accounting or tax developments. 
(f) Companies should develop a comprehensive formal  program of individual director performance 
assessment and feedback. This should include the chairman of the board. Under this program, each 
director should receive detailed feedback on the quality of their contribution. 
(g) Financial Institutions should develop and adopt a charter of expectations for directors which 
enunciates the specific responsibilities to be discharged by the bank directors and the individual roles 
expected of them. This charter should stipulate the personal and professional characteristics 
expected of all directors and provide benchmarks against which a director will be evaluated. These 
criteria could also provide a recruitment model for use in selecting new directors. Among the 
relevant criteria would be the institution’s record in complying with laws and regulations, criticisms  
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contained in audit and inspection reports and their resolution, management’s responsiveness to 
board directives and policies, the timeliness, quality, and accuracy of management’s 
recommendations and reports, and  management’s presentations to the board. 
Good corporate governance requires the active responsibility and commitment of the board of 
directors directly and through its committees to the management of the company￿s business and 
affairs. Good corporate governance also requires sound ethics, integrity, judgment and values at the 
level of the board of directors and throughout the company. 
 
Corporate Governance: A French Point of View 
 
The recent ViØnot Report on Corporate governance in France summarized their findings as follows: 
The Committee considered first the two issues for which the Ministry of Justice issued proposals on 
July 31, 1999, to wit, separation of the office of chairman of the Board of Directors from the office 
of chief executive officer, on the one hand, and disclosure of the compensation and options granted 
to corporate officers of listed companies, on the other hand. 
 
Separation of the offices of chairman and chief executive officer 
 
1. The Committee is favorable to the introduction in French law of an alternative allowing the Board 
of Directors to opt for combination or separation of the offices of chairman and chief executive 
officer, which option should always be subject to reversal by a further resolution of the Board of 
Directors. 
As a result of such a statutory reform : 
2. In the event of option for separation, the rules of operation of the Board will have to specify the 
duties assigned to the chairman of the Board of Directors, by delimitation in relation to the powers 
of the chief executive officer and those of the Board itself (frequency of meetings, agenda, presiding 
at the meeting of shareholders, monitoring of the corporation’s operation, etc.). 
3. In that situation, the chief executive officer will need to be a Director and be appointed by the 
Board upon the chairman’s motion, will have full powers to act in all circumstances in the 
corporation’s name, and will have the title of directeur gØnØral exØcutif (chief executive officer). 
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4. Regardless of the election made, the rules of operation of the Board will have to specify clearly 
the 
division of powers between the Board of Directors, on the one hand, and the chairman and chief 
executive officer (combination) or the chief executive officer (separation), on the other hand. 
In particular, areas such as the group’s indebtedness and its major acquisitions and divestments will 
have to be subjected to resolutions passed in due time by the Board of Directors of the parent 
company, even if they are not legally mandatory. 
5. The statutory rules with respect to civil and criminal liability will need to be amended so as to 
provide for the situation where the Board of Directors elects to separate the positions of chairman 
and chief executive officer, so that the chairman of the Board of Directors, devoid of management 
prerogatives, could be held liable only in respect of misconduct connected with his personal duties. 
6. The grounds for and justification of the election made by the Board of Directors between 
combination and separation of the duties will need to be stated in the annual report. 
 
Disclosure of the compensation granted to corporate officers of listed 
companies 
 
7. The annual reports of listed companies should include a chapter, drafted with assistance from the 
compensation committee, relating to disclosure to the shareholders of the compensation collected 
by the corporate officers. 
8. The first part of this chapter should describe in detail the policy for determination of the 
compensation granted to the members of the general-management team : principles for allocation of 
the fixed and variable portions, criteria for determination of the basis for variable portions, rules for 
the award of bonuses. 
9. The second part should specify the aggregate amount of compensation of all kinds collected by 
such corporate officers, broken down between the fixed and variable portions. 
10. The third part should specify the aggregate and individual amounts of attendance fees paid to the 
Directors and the rules for allocation among them, and the rules for collection of attendance fees 
granted to members of the general-management team in respect of directorships held in group 
affiliates.  
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11. In addition, the Committee recommends that a statutory amendment allow the Board of 
Directors to resolve upon payment of all or part of the attendance fees due to Directors in shares of 
the corporation’s stock. 
Disclosure of stock-option or stock-purchase plans in listed corporations 
 
12. The annual reports of listed corporations having granted options should include a chapter 
relating to such options in the part of the report dealing with the structure of and changes in the 
stock. 
13. This chapter, prepared by the Board committee in charge of grant of the options, should 
describe the policy for the grant of options to all the beneficiaries and to the members of the 
general-management team. In particular, the nature of the options, the criteria for determination of 
the classes of beneficiaries, the frequency of plans, and the terms set by Board of Directors for 
exercise of the options, should be specified. 
14. In addition, a recapitulating table should set out all the data provided for with respect to options 
in the « shelf document », and a statement of the discount granted or premium charged. A separate 
line should provide such information for the members of the general-management team in the 
aggregate, and equivalent data for the options granted to them, if applicable, in other group affiliates. 
Directors 
 
The Committee considers that without affecting the duration of current terms of office, the duration 
of the Directors’ term of office, set by the by-laws, should not exceed a maximum of four years, in 
order to enable the shareholders to rule upon their appointment with sufficient frequency. 
16.The terms of office should be staggered so as to avoid renewal as a whole and to make the 
replacement of Directors smoother. 
17. The annual report should specify precisely the dates of the initiation and expiry of each 
Director’s term, so as to highlight the staggering. 
It should also mention for each Director his or her age, major executive position, and directorships 
in other listed corporations (other than group affiliates), and specify the names of all the members of 
each Board committee. 
18. When a Director’s appointment or the extension of his or her term of office is referred to the 
meeting of shareholders, the annual report and notice calling the shareholders should include, in 
addition to the statutory statements, a biographical notice outlining his or her resume.  
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19. The number of shares of stock held by each Director in his or her personal capacity in the 
corporation concerned should be entered in the annual report and notice calling the meeting of 
shareholders. 
20. The Committee stresses the recommendation in the 1995 report, that a Director performing 
executive duties in a listed corporation should limit the number of outside directorships, and in any 
event abstain from holding directorships in more than five listed French or foreign corporations 
other than group affiliates. 
Operation of the Board of Directors 
 
21. The Committee points out the need for the Board of Directors to review on a periodic basis its 
membership, organization and operation. The existence of this review should be notified to the 
shareholders in the annual report. 
22. The Committee considers that the definition of an independent Director contained in the 1995 
report may be simplified as follows : 
« A Director is independent of the corporation’s management when he or she has no relationship of 
any kind whatsoever with the corporation or its group that is such as to jeopardize exercise of his or 
her free judgment ». 
The independent Directors should account for at least one-third of the Board of Directors. 
They should also account for at least one-third of the audit committee and appointments committee. 
The compensation and options committee, for its part, should have a majority of independent 
Directors among its members. 
24. The independent Directors should be identified as such in the annual report. 
25. The frequency and duration of meetings of the Board of Directors should be such as to allow in-
depth review and discussion of matters within the Board’s purview. 
The same is true of meetings of the Board committees (e.g., audit, compensation and options, and 
appointments committees). 
26. The number of meetings of the Board of Directors and Board committees held during the past 
financial year should be specified in the annual report, which should also provide the shareholders 
with appropriate information regarding the Directors’ attendance at such meetings. 
27. Corporations are bound to provide their Directors, if appropriate, with information prior to 
meetings (of the Board) and on a continuing basis (between meetings of the Board) which is  
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sufficient, relevant and of first rate quality, and such as to enable them to perform their duties 
effectively. 
Directors are bound to request appropriate information which they consider to be necessary in order 
to perform their duties. 
Operation of the Board committees  
 
28. Committees of the Board should be allowed the opportunity to approach, in performance of 
their duties, the corporation’s main officers after informing the chairman of the Board of Directors, 
and subject to reporting to the Board. The Board committees should be able to request external 
technical reviews of matters within their purview, at the corporation’s expense, after informing 
thereof the chairman of the Board of Directors or the Board itself, and subject to reporting to the 
Board. 
30. The audit committee should submit every year to the Board of Directors a report : 
concerning the amount of auditing and consulting fees paid by the corporation and its affiliates to 
entities in the network to which the statutory auditors belong, and the related percentage of the 
total amount of fees collected by such network during the year; concerning the assignment to 
entities in the network to which the statutory auditors belong of any assistance and consulting 
duties, material either in terms of importance for the corporation and its affiliates or in terms of the 
amount of related fees. Corporations should not entrust significant assistance or consulting 
assignments to entities in the network to which their statutory auditors belong unless that network is 
able to warrant that such assignment is not liable to impair the statutory auditors’ independence and 
objectivity. 
31. The audit committee should refer to the Board of Directors the issue of selection of the 
accounting standards for the consolidation of accounts. For such purpose, it should be provided 
with precise documentation drafted by the corporation’s financial management under technical 
supervision by the statutory auditors, ensure that it is updated, and submit to the Board for review 
an advisory document highlighting all the consequences of the terms of the election. 
32. The appointments committee (or an ad hoc committee) should draw up a plan for succession of 
the 
executive Directors. The chairman should be a member of that committee, but not its chairman. 
 
  





33. The Committee recommends that listed corporations ensure that they are able as soon as 
possible to publish : 
estimated (provisional) consolidated annual accounts at the latest one month after the close of the 
financial year, if they are unable to draw up the final accounts within two months after the close 
of the financial year; final consolidated accounts at the latest three months after the close of the 
financial year; final consolidated half-yearly accounts at the latest two and a half months after the 
end of the first half if they are unable to publish estimated (provisional) accounts sooner. 
The meeting of shareholders 
 
34. The Committee recommends that corporations in future cease submitting to an extraordinary 
meeting of shareholders a resolution expressly permitting the use of delegations of authority to 
increase the capital after a take-over bid has been made. 
Implementation of the recommendations 
 
35. The Committee considers that it is necessary that listed corporations should specify clearly, in 
their 
annual reports, compliance with the recommendations in the 1995 report and these 
recommendations, and explain, if applicable, the reasons for not implementing some of them. 
 
Corporate Governance: Hong Kong SAR Best Practice Code 
 
CODE OF BEST PRACTICE 
 
The following guidelines are intended to form the skeleton of a code of best practice to which listed 
issuers should aim. The following items are not intended to be rules, which are to be rigidly adhered 
to. All issuers are encouraged to devise their own codes of practice in the interests not only of their 
independent non-executive directors, but also of the board of directors as a whole. 
 
1.  Full board meetings shall be held no less frequently than every six months. ￿Full￿ board 
meetings means meetings at which directors are physically present and not ￿paper￿ meetings 
or meetings by circulation. 
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2.  Except in emergencies an agenda and accompanying board papers should be sent in full to 
all directors at least 2 days before the intended date of a board meeting (or such other period 
as the board agrees). 
 
3.  Except  in  emergencies  adequate  notice  should  be  given  of  a  board  meeting  to  give  all 
directors an opportunity to attend. 
 
4.  All directors, executive and non-executive, are entitled to have access to board papers and 
materials.  Where  queries  are  raised  by  non-executive  directors,  steps  must  be  taken  to 
respond as promptly and fully as possible. 
 
5.  Full minutes shall be kept by a duly appointed secretary of the meeting and such minutes 
shall be open for inspection at any time in office hours on reasonable notice by any director. 
 
6.  The directors’ fees and any other reimbursement or emolument payable to an independent 
non-executive director shall be disclosed in full in the annual report and accounts of the 
issuer. 
 
7.  Non-executive directors should be appointed for a specific term and that term should be 
disclosed in the annual report and accounts of the issuer. 
 
8.  If, in respect of any matter discussed at a board meeting, the independent non-executive 
directors hold views contrary to those of the executive directors, the minutes should clearly 
reflect this. 
 
9.  Arrangements shall be made in appropriate circumstances to enable the independent non-
executive directors of the board, at their request, to seek separate professional advice at the 
expense of the issuer. 
 
10.  Every non-executive director must ensure that he can give sufficient time and attention to 
the affairs of the issuer and should not accept the appointment if he cannot. 
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11.  If a matter to be considered by the board involves a conflict of interest for a substantial 
shareholder or a director, a full board meeting should be held and the matter should not be 
dealt with by circulation or by committee. 
 
12.  If an independent non-executive director resigns or is removed from office, the Exchange 
should be notified of the reasons why. 
 
13.  Every director on the board is required to keep abreast of his responsibilities as a director of 
a listed issuer.  Newly appointed board members should receive an appropriate briefing on 
the issuer￿s affairs and be provided by the issuer￿s company secretary with relevant corporate 
governance materials currently published by the Exchange on an ongoing basis. 
 
14.  This board should establish an audit committee with written terms of reference which deal 
clearly with its authority and duties.  Amongst the committee￿s principal duties should be the 
review and supervision of the issuer’￿ financial reporting process and internal controls.  For 
further guidance on establishing an audit committee listed issuers may refer to ￿A Guide For 
The  Formation  Of  An  Audit  Committee￿  published  by  the  Hong  Kong  Society  of 
Accountants in December 1997.  Listed issuers may adopt the terms of reference set out in 
that guide, except that the committee may have a minimum of two members, or they may 
adopt any other comparable terms of reference for the implementation of audit committees.  
The  committee  should  be  appointed  from  amongst  the  non-executive  directors  and  a 
majority of the non-executive directors should be independent. 
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Corporate Governance: A German Perspective 
 
General questions of Corporate Governance 
 
The purpose of Corporate Governance is to achieve a responsible, value-oriented management and 
control of companies. Corporate Governance Rules promote and reinforce the confidence of 
current and future shareholders, lenders, employees, business partners and the general public in 
national and international markets. The Supervisory Board, Management Board and Executive Staff 
of the Company identify themselves with these Rules and are contractually bound by them. They are 
part of the general obligation to observe other interests related to the corporate activity. 
The Rules of the Code serve as general guidelines for Corporate Governance for quoted German 
companies. Quoted companies are all enterprises whose shares are officially listed on a German 
stock exchange or traded over-the counter. 
The Rules, their acceptance, implementation and respective adjustments to the specifics of the 
individual Company shall be communicated in the Annual Report. 
Due to the various legal systems, institutional parameters and traditions, there is presently no 
internationally accepted universal model for Corporate Governance. 
The parameters for the Code are provided by codified law and leading cases, generally accepted 
national and international codes of good conduct and market practice. They include the directly 
relevant provisions of company and group law, in particular, the law governing stock corporations, 
financial accounting, banking supervision and the capital market as well as the Company’s 
Memorandum and Articles of Association. From these derive the provisions, some of them detailed, 
with regard to the responsibilities and duties of the governing bodies: Supervisory Board (§§ 95-116 
German Stock Corporation Act), Management Board (§§ 76-94 German Stock Corporation Act) 
and General Meeting (§§ 118-147 German Stock Corporation Act) as well as the code of 
conduct of the members of the governing bodies. 
The essential points of the OECD Principles for Corporate Governance of May 
1999 are covered as follows: 
Protection of Shareholders’ rights: Following the introduction of the German Act on Corporate 
Control and Transparency (KonTraG) in 1998, there are adequate provisions safeguarding the rights 
of shareholders through the comprehensive mandatory rules under the German Stock Corporation  
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Act. In particular, the following OECD points are covered by mandatory law (§ 23 German Stock 
Corporation Act): 
 
full voting right for each ordinary share (§ 12 German Stock Corporation Act) 
no impediments with regard to ownership or registration (§ 67 German Stock Corporation Act) 
transferability of shares at any time (§ 68 German Stock Corporation Act) 
participation, proxy and exercise of voting rights at General Meetings (§134 German Stock  
Corporation Act) 
election of members of the Supervisory Board (§ 101 German Stock Corporation Act) 
participation in company profits (§ 58 German Stock Corporation Act). 
These points are mandatorily covered by German Law (§ 23 German Stock Corporation Act). 
An authorization to increase the share capital with exclusion of shareholder participation rights in 
order to pursue either an acquisition or a share placement near the prevailing market price will only 
be exercised by the Management Board if the share capital increase does not exceed 10 % of the 
then existing share capital. In this calculation the re-utilization of any repurchased shares will 
be included. 
Equal treatment of shareholders: The ’Equal treatment of shareholders’ stipulated by the OECD is 
also in place for German companies. The precautionary measures against insider trading, self-dealing 
and disclosure of any personal interests in transactions or matters are extended beyond the legal 
requirements by the subsequent points ’II. Management Board’ and ’III. Supervisory Board’. 
Until the enactment of the German Takeover Law, the voluntary Takeover Code of the Capital 
Markets Expert Commission of the German Ministry of Finance applies. This Code is accepted by 
the Company. 
In the case of repurchase of own shares according to § 71, subparagraph 1, No. 8 German Stock 
Corporation Act, the Company shall observe the principle of equal treatment of all shareholders. 
Disclosure and transparency: The point ’Disclosure and transparency’ of the OECD Principles is 
generally covered by law for German companies through the corresponding provisions on the 
obligation to provide and enclose information (§§ 20 - 22, 160, 328 German Stock Corporation Act; 
§§ 15, 25 German Securities Trading Act; §§ 285, 325 ff German Commercial Code; §§ 35, 39 
German Antitrust Act; § 24 German Banking Act). In addition, the Management Board shall 
regularly and with due regard to equal treatment of all shareholders (’Fair Disclosure’) report on all 
Company matters through Annual and Interim Reports, ’ad hoc’ communications, analyst and press  
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conferences. The OECD information requirements are covered by these publicity undertakings. The 
Company shall adopt an accounting standard that is suitable for international comparison purposes. 
 
As the Management Board and Supervisory Board of German companies have the decisive 




1.) Responsibilities and duties 
a) In the management of the Company, the Management Board is bound by Corporate interest, 
Company policy and the Group’s guidelines as well as the basic principles of proper management (§ 
76 German Stock Corporation Act). 
b) The Management Board develops, in consultation with the Supervisory Board, the strategy for the 
Group and is responsible for its implementation. 
c) The Management Board is responsible for ensuring compliance with legal provisions within the 
Group and to ensure their observation by Group companies. 
2.) Information and disclosure requirements 
a) The Management Board will publish without delay any new facts arising in the sphere of the 
Company’s activities which are not yet publicly known and, due to their impact on their financial 
position of the Company or its general course of business, are likely to impact significantly 
on the price of the Company’s listed securities (§ 15 German Securities Trading Act). 
As part of its regular communication efforts, the dates of major regular publications (such as annual 
and quarterly reports, General Meetings) shall be published in a ’Financial Calendar’ (at least one 
year) in advance. The information published by the company shall also be available in the ’Internet’. 
This is to include the invitation to General Meetings, their agenda as well as shareholder initiatives 
and management comments hereto as well as voting results of such meetings. If possible, all 
publications 
are provided in the English language. 
b) The company shall pursue the principle of equal treatment of all shareholders 
in the matter of information dissemination. 
c) The regular financial reporting (annual and quarterly reports) will be timely. The quarterly reports 
contain segment reporting as well as results per share.  
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d) The Management Board shall inform the Supervisory Board on a regular 
basis, in good time and comprehensively about all relevant matters regarding business development, 
risk exposure and risk management of the company and major group subsidiaries. 
e) Should the business trend or risk exposure of the Group change significantly against plan, the 
Management Board must immediately inform the Supervisory Board through its Chairman, who will 
call an extraordinary Supervisory Board meeting if so indicated. 
 
The Management Board shall list in the Notes to the Company Accounts the corporations in which 
the Company holds a minimum of 10% of the share capital. Exempt from this are participations that 
are of immaterial importance for the Company’s asset, financial and profit situation. 
Equally, any existing mutual shareholdings and any shareholdings in the Company which have been 
notified by third parties as well as the owner(s) of such shareholdings must be reported in the Notes 
to the Accounts. 
g) As soon as the Company is notified (§ 25 German Securities Trading Act), or becomes otherwise 
aware that another party has obtained, exceeds or no longer holds 5, 10, 25, 50 or 75% of the voting 
rights in the Company, this will immediately be published by the Management Board. 
h) In the Notes to the Company Accounts details with regard to the Management Board’s interest in 
shares of the Company (including any existing option rights) and their changes in relation to the 
previous year have to be published. 
3.) Remuneration 
a) The remuneration of the Management Board and the Executive Staff shall include sufficient 
motivation to ensure long-term corporate value creation. This includes share option programmes 
and performance-related incentives related to the share price development and the continuing 
success of the company. In connection with the granting of share options and similar rights to 
members of the Management Board and the executive staff the following points shall be observed: 
The initial exercise of the rights arising from share option programmes shall not be possible before 
two years since the grant. To document the incentive character as well as to balance the surrender of 
the subscription right by the shareholders, the exercise shall depend on achieving or exceeding 
relevant and transparent benchmarks (e.g. the development of an industry index). 
The structure, total amount, exercise prices and exercise periods as well as the allocations of share 
options and similar rights in the reporting period shall be published in the Notes to the Company 
Accounts, separately by members of the Management Board and Executive Staff.  
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To ensure compliance with insider laws, suitable precautions like closed periods of time are 
implemented. 
b) The fixed and variable remuneration elements of the Management Board shall be detailed in the 
Annual Report. 
4.) Rules governing conflicts of interest and own-account transactions 
a) In the running of the management of the company, the Management Board members must not 
pursue any own interest that could be in conflict with the interest of the Company. 
 
b)Members of the Management Board must disclose to the Supervisory  Board material personal 
interests in transactions of the Company and Group companies as well as other conflicts of interest. 
They must also inform their Management Board colleagues. 
c) All transactions between the Company or any Group company and Management Board members 
as well as associated persons or companies must comply with normal industry standards. The 
transactions and the terms and conditions thereof must be approved in advance by 
the Supervisory Board. They may not run counter to the interests of the Company or any Group 
company. The granting of loans to Management Board members must be approved by the 
Supervisory Board with advance notice to the Management Board. In all such transactions, the 
Company shall be represented by the Supervisory Board. 
d) Management Board members and senior Group executives may not exploit business 
opportunities available to the Company or Group companies for themselves or for the benefit of 
associated persons or companies. 
e) Management Board members and senior Group executives are also prohibited from conducting 
transactions, conflicting with the interests of the Company or any Group company, for themselves 
or for associated persons. This prohibition also extends beyond their business duties. 
Management Board members must disclose to the whole Management Board transactions (except 
daily life transactions) among themselves or with Supervisory Board members or senior Group 
executives. The transactions require the approval of the Supervisory Board. 
f) Management Board members and senior Group executives are during their employment subject to 
a comprehensive prohibition of competition (Members of the Management Board: § 88 German 
Stock Corporation Act).  
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g) Any other activities of Management Board members, in particular the acceptance of Supervisory 
Board appointments, require the approval of the Supervisory Board. Any other activities of senior 
Group executives require the approval of the Management Board. 
h) The purchase and sale of Company shares, options or other share derivatives by members of the 
Management Board and senior Group executives are subject to special rules. It is generally 
welcomed that the Management Board and senior Group executives document their identification 
with the Company through a shareholder status. However, they should refrain from frequent 
transactions and counter transactions which aim to achieve very short term gains (speculative 
deals). Appropriate measures such as closed periods for the purchase or sale of shares should ensure 
the observation of the provisions of the insider laws. The Management Board shall ensure the 
compliance through a Compliance Officer that shall report to the Supervisory Board at least once a 
year. Management Board members and Group employees may in connection with their activity 
neither request nor receive gifts or other advantages for themselves or third parties, if this could 
jeopardize the interests of the Group or the interests of customers. 
 Supervisory Board 
 
1.) Composition 
a) The proposals for election of Supervisory Board members to the General Meeting shall ensure 
that the proposed candidates have both the required knowledge and skills as well as the relevant 
professional experience. 
To ensure efficiency, regard will be given to size and composition of the Supervisory Board. Board 
Members must make sufficient time available to exercise their activity in a diligent manner. 
b) The Supervisory Board shall ensure independent advice and monitoring of the Management 
Board through a sufficient number of independent persons who have no current or former business 
association with the Group. This shall also be taken into consideration for the composition 
of the Supervisory Board committees. The proposal for election to the Supervisory Board shall not 
include as a matter of course the election of retiring Management Board members. 
c) If a member of the Supervisory Board does not participate personally in more than half of the 
Board Meetings of any given fiscal year, this has to be notified in the Annual Report. 
d) The remuneration of the Supervisory Board shall appropriately reflect the responsibility, the work 
performed and the increase in the corporate value. The total remuneration shall be listed in the 
Notes to the Company Accounts.  
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e) The Notes to the Company Accounts shall contain details of the shareownership (including 
existing option rights) of the Supervisory Board members and their changes in relation to the 
previous year. 
2.) Responsibilities and duties 
a) The Supervisory Board advises the Management Board on a regular basis regarding the 
management of the Company and the Group and monitors the achievement of the long term 
corporate goals (monitoring: § 111 German Stock Corporation Act). The Supervisory Board 
appoints the members of the Management Board and ensures an orderly longterm succession 
planning (§ 84 German Stock Corporation Act). 
b) The Supervisory Board can subject certain transactions to its approval (§111 German Stock 
Corporation Act). This refers in particular to investment projects, loans, the establishment of 
subsidiaries as well as the acquisition or disposal of shareholdings above a certain size. The members 
are bound to confidentiality with regard to all specific information and company secrets. 
d) The Supervisory Board issues its own Standing Rules and stipulates 
the information and reporting duties of the Management Board. 
e) The Supervisory Board mandates the Auditors to audit the Company and the Group annual 
accounts (§111 German Stock Corporation Act). 
Particular regard shall be given to: 
that the mandated Auditor has not achieved during the last five years with the Audit and advice of 
the Company (or with corporations where the Company is a shareholder with more than 20%) 
more than 30% of his total revenue. This should also not be expected for the current fiscal year, 
that no auditor is employed in the Audit that has issued the auditors confirmation for the Annual 
Accounts or Group Accounts in more than 6 instances in the 10 years preceding the audit, that no 
conflicts of interest exist for the Auditor. 
All members of the Supervisory Board shall receive the Audit Reports in good time before the 
pertinent Supervisory Board meetings (§ 170 German Stock Corporation Act). Audit related 
meetings shall be held in the presence of the Auditors (§ 171 German Stock Corporation Act). 
f) Contracts, in particular consulting contracts of the company with members of Supervisory Board 
require the approval of Supervisory Board (except every day transactions). 
g) The Supervisory Board shall receive regularly (at least annually) a report by the Management 
Board with regard to donations exceeding an amount determined by the Supervisory Board.  
GLOBAL THINKING RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT 
32
32
3.) Establishment of Committees 
The Supervisory Board shall establish in line with its Standing Rules various committees to deal with 
complex business matters. With regard to the composition of such committees, the Supervisory 
Board shall ensure the requisite professional experience. Incorporation and duties of committees 
are subject to the specific circumstances and the size of the Company. The following committees 
could be instituted: 
General Committee: The General Committee shall advise the Management Board and prepare the 
decisions to be taken by the Supervisory Board. The General Committee deals with general policy 
matters for the Group. It discusses the strategy and planning for the Group and its business 
segments submitted by the Management Board on the basis of different scenarios and their 
feasibility. The General Committee assesses the internal state of the Group with regard to its 
operating strength, efficiency and potential to achieve the formulated targets. It reviews the 
Corporate Governance Rules and their compliance on a regular basis (generally once a year). 
 
Accounts and Audit Committee: The Accounts and Audit Committee is responsible for matters 
pertaining to the accounting and auditing for the Company and the Group. The Committee 
evaluates the Auditor’s reports and reports to the Supervisory Board on its assessment of the 
comments in the audit report, particularly with regard to the future development of the Group. It 
verifies the Management Board’s assumptions on the budget figures for the Group and its business 
segments. 
Important other documents issued to shareholders shall be presented before publication to the 
Committee.The tasks of the Accounts and Audit Committee regularly comprise: 
- the preparation of the selection of the Auditor, the determination of major auditing issues, even if  
exceeding the legally required points and content of the Audit, as well as the determination of the 
Auditors’ fee, - the preparation of the audit of the Annual and Group Accounts by the Supervisory 
Board, including the relevant business reports on the basis of the results of the audit and additional 
points raised by the Auditor, - the preparation of a report by the Management Board with regard 
to corporate donations exceeding an amount determined by the Supervisory Board, and, if 
applicable, - the discussion of partial auditing results during the year (e.g. of the internal control 
system), 
- the discussion of Interim Accounts and the results of any audits  




Personnel Committee: The Personnel Committee deals with the personnel issues of the 
Management Board (including its succession planning). The Personnel Committee shall recommend 
with regard to the content of the employment contracts of the Management Board including 
their remuneration. In addition, the Committee is responsible for the approval of paid for outside 
company work by members of the Management Board. The granting of loans to members of the 
Management Board and the Supervisory Board shall also be dealt with by the Committee. 
Nomination Committee: The Nomination Committee is in charge of the composition, size and 
balance of the Supervisory Board and the proposals for election to the General Meeting. 
Market- and Credit Risk Committee: This Committee supervises the handling of market risks and 
credit matters of the Group. It handles loans and other transactions requiring its approval and is 
informed of loans requiring its notification. For urgent matters, decisions can be delegated to 
nominated Committee members. 
Mediation Committee: German Stock companies that are subject to codetermination by law, are 
legally required to establish a Mediation Committee (§ 27 subpara 3 Co Determination Act of 1976). 
This Committee delivers proposals for the appointment of Management Board members if the 
required two thirds majority for the appointment or termination of Management Board members 
has not been achieved. 
4.) Rules governing conflicts of interest and own-account transactions 
a) The Supervisory Board members must disclose any conflicts of interest to the Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board or his deputy unless they retire for cause. In the event of conflicts of interests, 
the Chairman of the Supervisory Board or his deputy shall decide to whom the information should 
be forwarded and whether the member of the Supervisory Board in question shall participate in 
meetings. 
b) In their decisions Supervisory Board members must not pursue their own interests or those of 
associated persons or companies, which are in conflict with the interests of the Company or any 
Group company.  
They may not pursue for their own benefit business available to the Company or its Group 
companies. In the event of possible conflicts of interest, the interests of the Company and its Group 
companies must take priority and the Supervisory Board members concerned must abstain 
from voting.  
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c) All transactions between the Company, any Group company and Supervisory Board members as 
well as associated persons or companies must comply with normal industry standards. The 
transactions (except: daily life transactions) and their terms must be approved in advance by 
the Supervisory Board. They may not run counter to the interests of the Company or any Group 
company. 
d) The granting of loans to Supervisory Board members by the Company or Group companies 
require the agreement of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board. 
e) Supervisory Board members may, in conjunction with their activity, neither request nor receive 
gifts or other advantages for themselves or third parties, if this could jeopardize the interests of the 
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Corporate Governance: A British Commonwealth Perspective 
 
 
￿Many countries are concerned that globalisation will leave them behind. Our task is 
to ensure that the benefits of the global economy are shared widely among all our 
peoples.￿  
The Rt Hon Tony Blair, Prime Minister, United Kingdom  
 
￿If globalisation is to deliver its full benefits, the responsibility for reforms must not 
lie with developing countries alone.The developed world, too must open up its 
markets to products from the developing world.￿ 
Mr.Julian Olgivie Thompson, Former Chairman and Chief Executive, Anglo 
American Plc 
￿Business ethics is the single most important issue that needs to be addressed by 
business...and it is one which is of utmost concern to our stakeholders. We need to 
build in a sense of fairness in our decision-making - fairness to all our stakeholders.￿ 
Mr Rahul Bajaj ,Chairman and Managing Director Bajaj Auto Ltd. India  
 
The Commonwealth Business Council has published corporate governance principles in association 
with the Commonwealth Association for Corporate Governance in the publication Principles for 
Corporate Governance in the Commonwealth: Towards Global Competitiveness and Economic 
Accountability. The Commonwealth corporate governance principles are given below  
 
Commonwealth Corporate Governance Principles 
Principle 1: Exercise leadership, enterprise, integrity and judgement in directing the corporation so 
as to achieve continuing prosperity for the corporation and to act in the best interest of the business 
enterprise in a manner based on transparency, accountability and responsibility;   
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Principle 2: Ensure that through a managed and effective process board appointments are made 
that provide a mix of proficient directors, each of whom is able to add value and to bring 
independent judgement to bear on the decision-making process;  
Principle 3: Determine the corporation’s purpose and values, determine the strategy to achieve its 
purpose and to implement its values in order to ensure that it survives and thrives, and ensure that 
procedures and practices are in place that protect the corporation’s assets and reputation;  
Principle 4: Monitor and evaluate the implementation of strategies, policies, management 
performance criteria and business plans; 
Principle 5: Ensure that the corporation complies with all relevant laws, regulations and codes of 
best business practice; 
Principle 6: Ensure that the corporation communicates with shareholders and other stakeholders 
effectively; 
Principle 7: Serve the legitimate interests of the shareholders of the corporation and account to 
them fully; 
Principle 8: Identify the corporation’s internal and external stakeholders and agree a policy, or 
policies, determining how the corporation should relate to them;  
Principle 9: Ensure that no one person or block of persons has unfettered power and that there is 
an appropriate balance of power and authority on the board which is, inter alia, usually reflected by 
separating the roles of chief executive officer and chairman, and by having a balance between 
executive and non-executive directors;  
Principle 10: Regularly review processes and procedures to ensure the effectiveness of its internal 
systems of control, so that its decision-making capability and the accuracy of its reporting and 
financial results are maintained at a high level at all times; 
Principle 11: Regularly assess its performance and effectiveness as a whole, and that of the 
individual directors, including the chief executive officer;   
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Principle 12: Appoint the chief executive officer and at least participate in the appointment of 
senior management, ensure the motivation and protection of intellectual capital intrinsic to the 
corporation, ensure that there is adequate training in the corporation for management and 
employees, and a succession plan for senior management;  
Principle 13: Ensure that all technology and systems used in the corporation are adequate to 
properly run the business and for it to remain a meaningful competitor; 
Principle 14: Identify key risk areas and key performance indicators of the business enterprise and 
monitor these factors; 


















At The Economic Development Institute we have identified good corporate governance as a 
priority for Corporate Jamaica. We see it as a critical factor for a strengthened Public and  
Private Sector. Due to the various legal systems, institutional parameters and traditions, there is 
presently no internationally accepted universal model for Corporate Governance, as such we have 
examined different perspectives from across the globe and all point in the same direction, good 
corporate governance is the most effective corporate vehicle available which we can use to 
integrate effectively in to the global village. However, we caution that a Jamaican model best 
suited to catapult us forward should be explored, rather than adopting a foreign model fully. 
Herein lies the opportunity for Jamaican companies to support this important issue of corporate 
governance by making it a priority in your respective companies. Your efforts to improve 
corporate governance will inure to the benefit of  the entire Jamaica and will foster real economic 
development in order  to meet the challenges of Globalization. 
 